Marseille, the Mediterranean & the Sun King by Arazoo Ferozan

Gary: Today’s special episode is by Arazoo Ferozan, a Ph.D candidate at McMaster University in Ontario, Canada. She returns to continue her work on her specialty, Marseille’s port, France’s portal to the Mediterranean world. This time she talks about how the great southern port city developed under the Sun King Louis XIV.

Arazoo: Our story today takes us to the winter of 1660, when a young Louis XIV, who had recently established his self-rule government in Paris, was on his way to visit southern France’s central provinces. During his minority government, two consecutive civil wars and the Franco-Spanish War disrupted the stability of the French monarchy. While the above-mentioned conflicts were more or less under control by the 1660s, what brought the King and his army to southern France was a series of local anti-royalist rebellions as a response to internal political issues and economic catastrophes. Having recently signed the Treaty of the Pyrenees, to end the Franco-Spanish War, Louis XIV was now determined to put an end to further uprisings, to unify his territories under a strong central government, and gain the loyalty and most importantly the submission of his people.[1] Marching forward with his musketeers, the Swiss guards and foot soldiers travelling ahead of his carriage, the King meant to make an unforgettable entrance and display his royal power and grandeur. As he reached Marseille, his army infiltrated the city’s walls with the help of the governor of Provence; and on the 2ndof March, he entered through a breached wall near Porte Réale. As a sign of his displeasure with the Marseillais for the recent and unpleasant events, he refused to accept the customary “two golden keys” of the city presented by the magistrate and the municipal councillors. The objective was to show the Marseillais nobility and dissidents that the King was no longer tolerant of their disloyalty and treachery.[2] During his five-day stay, he profoundly restructured the city’s administration and stripped the existing municipal nobility of all their powers by appointing royal supporters.[3] The newly reformed municipal government began functioning with a series of institutional, commercial, and infrastructural changes that urbanized Marseille and expanded its commercial reach across the Mediterranean.

Hi, this is Arazoo Ferozan, and you are listening to the French History Podcast. In this episode, we will discuss some vital elements of the urbanization and commercial expansion plans proposed by the French Crown and how they contributed to Marseille’s success in Mediterranean trade. While the Marseillais stakeholders were skeptical of the Crown’s interference in what they considered to be municipal matters, in the long run the urbanization project improved the port facilities, created living spaces for merchants, welcomed the royal navy to protect commercial ships, and streamlined the process of inspecting ships and cargo crossing the city’s borders by land or the sea.  Furthermore, in 1669, Marseille received the designation of a “Free Port” for Levantine trade, which enabled the city to monopolize Mediterranean trade for decades to come. A close look at urban and institutional developments in commercial harbours like Marseille reveal how port cities transformed themselves to compete in sea-borne trade during an age of global maritime expansion.

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, great powers of Western Europe relentlessly competed for resources and markets of the Mediterranean, while small ports hoped to attract commercial traffic by functioning as transit harbours.[4] Furthermore, the Atlantic trade was expanding, and some historians even argue for the wanning of the Mediterranean as the centre of trading for western European countries. However, recent research shows that many Mediterranean cities confronted with these challenges, restructured public and commercial spaces, and adopted favourable trade and settlement policies to attract desirable investors, settlers, and trade experts. For example, the Dukes of Tuscany rebuilt Livorno from a small fishing harbour to an emporium for northern merchants in the Mediterranean by welcoming settlers such as Jews, Armenians, Greeks, and Levantines who had extensive commercial networks across the globe. The English created their version of a “free port” in Tangiers to attract commercial traffic and so did Italian cities like Genoa and Venice.

In France, part of the Crown’s plan to increase the commercial presence of its merchants in sea-born trade and attract foreign merchants was to create unique “duty-free” ports specific to territorial features and the commercial success of the cities. As such, L’orient was the designated port for the French East India Company, Dunkerque for the North Sea and the English Channel and Marseille, with its strategic Mediterranean position and ancient commercial history, took the role of the “duty-free” port for Levantine trade or Mediterranean in general.[5] During the first half of the seventeenth century, the political and economic instability faced by France enabled its competitors such as the British and the Dutch to dominate Mediterranean markets. Thus, the success of France’s mercantilist policies in the Great Sea was contingent upon increasing the commercial traffic that passed through Marseille’s port as France’s main connection to the Mediterranean. However, compared to its competitors, like Livorno, Marseille had outgrown its Medieval structures and was likely unable to accommodate the influx of population and commercial traffic anticipated or at least that is what the Crown’s administration thought. The city’s narrow, winding, and dirty roads contained tiny, dark, and crowded houses. The streets were also poorly paved, with only a few wide boulevards or squares, except the crowded quaysides with little to no street lighting.[6] Water channelled to the streets carried garbage and filth into the port area, and so did waste from industries such as tanneries and refuse from fish markets and fishing boats.[7] Municipal deliberations were dominated by calls to maintain the harbour’s sanitary conditions to smoothly facilitate its day-to-day operation.[8] This 70-hectare city was densely populated with 45,000 – 50,000 people around the time of Louis XIV's arrival in 1660. Public and commercial life concentrated mainly on the vicinity of the Old Port, thus due to congestion, many residents and businesses, such as craftsmen and innkeepers, moved slowly to the east and outside the city walls. In fact, more than 2000 properties appeared beyond the city walls, including houses and farms, to accommodate the growing population. In the Bastides, the rich took refuge from the excessive noise of the city caused by the daily movement of people and ships.[9] Although any visitor would admit that the hustling and bustling activities of the port and the colourful shops that sold unique goods of the Mediterranean were captivating sights. As Sharon Kettering suggests, “The city’s streets had a vitality and energy that was electrifying.” [10]

In many ways, Marseille was also a unique city with abundant commercial opportunities due to its strategic geographic position. Proud of its Greco-Roman heritage, this city called itself a Republic ruled by merchant oligarchs, many belonging to some of the oldest families of the city who were also in charge of the commercial affairs.[11] Marseillais stakeholders defended their city with jealousy and protected its commercial interest. Politically, Marseille was always a semi-independent city, no matter which ruler occupied and governed it over the centuries. In 1481, when the last Count of Provence, Charles III of Maine, died without a male heir, Louis XI of France inherited the city through his will. From the beginning, the French kings were well aware of the city's potential as a Mediterranean commercial port, with a long history of sea-borne trade due to its foundation as a Greek emporium in 600 BC. While Marseille could not commercially compete with cities such as Genoa, Venice or Livorno by the sixteenth century, its strategic location with access to major Mediterranean trade centres was invaluable to the French Crown. Furthermore, the city was between the Sea of Provence and the Gulf of the Lion on the east-west axis. On the north-south axis, it was a stopover for traders between the Rhone and the Mediterranean.[12] Because of this favourable position, Marseille’s ruling oligarchs continuously negotiated a semi-autonomous status in governance and sometimes even fought for complete independence.

The conflict that brought Louis XIV to the doorsteps of Provence in 1660 was such an attempt on the part of the Marseillais nobility to rule their city without the interference of the monarchy. Thus, Marseille experienced a period of turmoil administratively and commercially at the hands of a select group of nobles, merchants and their families who endlessly battled each other over municipal office positions and loyalty to the Crown, sometimes in fierce armed battles. Added to these issues were harsh winters, a severe earthquake, and intermittent plagues that were catastrophic for the economy. The central conflict had begun earlier in 1637 between Louis-Emmanuel de Valois, governor of Provence and Antoine de Valbelle, Marseille’s lieutenant of admiralty, over the city’s lack of paying its maintenance quota. Moreover, as the Crown’s representative, the royal governor's interference in the city’s election in 1646 made matters worse by angering those supporting Valbelle. In 1650, Valbelle and supporters occupied Hôtel de Ville, which was the headquarters of the city’s political and commercial administration. When Valbelle died in 1655, a royalist, Henri d’Oppède succeeded the stewardship of Provence. However, his allegiances from a former Frondeur to a royalist did not sit well with some of the most influential people in Provence.[13] Particularly, with a nobleman Gaspard de Niozelles who continued where Valbelle had left off and pursued the city’s goal of independence against d’Oppéde. Niozelles led a series of uprisings and proceeded to an election in 1658 despite the opposition from d’Oppède and created a municipal government in Hotel de Ville.

The rebellions and resistance continued until November of 1659 when marching from Toulon, the Crown’s military ships closed the Port’s entrance, and Niozelle went to hiding. Eventually, some opposers faced execution, and others were stripped of their noble titles, fined, or beheaded.[14] In January, the King made his way to several cities in the south to deal with the crisis and arrived in Marseille by March 1660. The end of this political crisis resulted in significant changes in Marseille's municipal structure, commercial infrastructure, and urban development for the next few decades. While Marseille was not the only city to rebel against the Crown in this period, it was a notably important commercial centre for the monarchy to ignore such discontent against his authority.

Furthermore, Jean Baptiste Colbert, minister of finance to Louis XIV, had devised a major mercantilist plan to expand France’s commercial and territorial reach, within which Marseille was to play a vital role as the main connection to the Ottoman port cities in the Mediterranean. On 22 March 1660, a letter drafted from the King’s office expressed his disappointment at the local nobility in charge of the city’s governance for their disloyalty, misconduct, and damages to the commercial stability of the port.

The re-organization of the municipal government curbed the power of the nobility, who rebelled against the King and returned the authority of the Chamber of Commerce, which the conseil had abolished during the volatile period of political infractions.[15] He banned the nobility from holding official positions that gave them political power, such as the duties of the aldermen. He placed an army of French and Swiss soldiers in the city, demolished the city gates, and constructed a royal arsenal.[16] He appointed a royalist, Nicolas Arnoul, as his steward of justice, police, and finance to fortify the city and the royal galleys. The construction of Fort Saint-Jean and Fort Nicholas, still standing on the two sides of the Vieux Port, began in 1660 and 1668, respectively.[17] The purpose of the forts was not so much for the city's protection from the outsiders as it was to intimidate and warn the Marseillais against discord.

To the Crown, appointing the most loyal individuals in the municipality was essential to maintaining order. The Crown appointed a Governornot of Marseillais origin to oversee the safety and proper administration of the city’s commerce and answered to the Royal Intendant of Provence.[18] He abolished the “Council of Three Hundred” and made a new administrative and governing body, the échevinsor aldermen, in charge of the municipality. Despite reluctance to trust the ruling elites, the Crown acknowledged their expertise in commerce and governance. He selected the (aldermen) from the city's most “suitable” merchants and expanded their authority and responsibility to assist the appointed Governor in his duties. The Échevins, in their basic terms, acted as “the police or justice of the city” and made the main body or majority of the stakeholders in the Chamber of Commerce.[19] The most important task of their duties was to deal with all matters concerning commerce, mainly to ensure that, logistically, there were no obstacles to merchant ships and vessels leaving or arriving at the Port.[20] Sixteen stewards maintained the port and quay’s function and ensured that ships were in good order before leaving for the sea.[21] While the duties of the city administration were separated at the beginning of the century, the Chamber of Commerce and its members (échivens, intendants, and stewards) remained an essential body of governance that also managed the flow of France’s trade, particularly in the Levant and North Africa. They received frequent reports from the ambassadors and consuls, which informed them of trade conditions and merchant conduct at the Ottoman trading posts.[22]

The “Aggrandizement” Project:

Marseille’s Urban and Commercial Development (1666)

Following the administrative changes, Colbert proposed an extensive urban development and expansion project to transform Marseille into an important commercial centre worthy of his mercantilist ambitions. In the second half of the century, the French landscape altered in various ways due to the rise of absolutism and the Crown’s goal of “taking charge of the urban” spaces. However, Marseille was not like any other city in southern France. The strong-headed urban elites and wealthy merchants, and now the echevnin, opposed any development ideas that did not come to their table locally, suggesting that changes implemented by the outsiders would ruin their city. When Colbert became the Controller-General of Finance in 1665, he recommended extensive plans to rebuild and improve Marseille’s infrastructure to accommodate the expected commercial traffic. He also suggested that the political instability and economic downturn in the first half of the century had diverted foreign investors and merchants from conducting trade through the city’s port. There were also official orders preventing non-Catholics and some foreign merchants from conducting commerce in the city.

If the Crown wished to maximize profit by using Marseille’s Mediterranean connection to its fullest, there was an immediate need for expansion and efficient facilities to accommodate commercial and migratory traffic.[23] The “aggrandizement” or urban expansion project had three components: first, to plan a neighbourhood for navel and royal personnel. Second, to devise a plan to encourage prominent merchants to move to the new city, and third, to improve the movement of people and goods by building wider boulevards.[24] As a result, the inhabitants would inherit a larger city with better avenues for commercial traffic, new living quarters, improved port facilities and sanitary living conditions. These changes meant to attract foreign merchants, dignitaries, investors, and other notable financiers, to trade, visit and, at times, permanently settle.[25] The planned included widening the main boulevards and building new housing and aristocratic mansions with careful attention to space, sanitation, and physical appearance. Shipyards, galleys, warehouses, and the two forts, St. Jean and St. Nicholas, secured sea traffic.[26] In this strategy, the “New City” section was dedicated mainly to the residents of the elite merchants of Marseille, foreign nobility and officers, bourgeois foreigners or those who had performed commerce for over twelve years.[27] Beautification of the city was a vital consideration to attract foreign traffic, not only merchants but delegates, ambassadors and other officials who visited the city. The royal galleys needed space and facilities to impress foreign officials and demonstrate the King's power and grandeur. The city plan included a courtyard square, a market, a garden, hotels, and lodging facilities for different social classes.[28] One historian writes, “Colbert’s aspiration for France to emulate imperial Rome found physical expression in urban expansion, in the construction of the neoclassical public buildings and the restoration of antique monuments […] architectural imperialism that transformed Marseille as well.”[29]  In a nutshell, it was redesigning, cleaning, and creating a big city to facilitate commerce and accommodate royal administrators. [30]

On June 8, 1666, Articles et Conditions granted François Roustan the right to enlarge the city, accommodating space for the galleys, rebuilding the Arsenal, the residential quarters, and a new market and collecting taxes to fund some aspects of the project.[31] The urbanization project met with mixed reactions from the Chamber and the municipality. They did not appreciate the monarchy's interference in such internal matters and proposed that such changes must be deliberated in the city council before implementation. They argued that the project catered to the need of foreigners and not the Marseillais, the new taxes would ruin businesses, landlords would be left with excessive burden, and expansion would create “a taste for luxury,” causing many to lose their fortunes.[32] Nicholas Arnoul, the royal intendant of the galleys, accused the échivens of self-interest, advising Colbert to enforce the royal plan, even if it meant without their permission.[33]

However, Colbert eventually gave in to the wishes of the Marseillais with some compromise, and the échevins reluctantly agreed based on his promise that all the aspects of the project would be implemented with mutual agreement.[34] The échivens became the leading body for the project, including a newly formed Bureau of the municipal magistracy and six elected directors to oversee the process. The échevins subsequently submitted their revision of the existing plan by assigning local architects Gaspard Puget and Mathieu Portal to extend the city 195 hectares from the eastern and southern sides with wide streets around the port area. They incorporated regional and Italian style architectures with wide streets and apartment buildings adorned with Ionic and Corinthian columns, even using Italian construction material. The newly transferred galleys found their new home near the refurbished Arsenal on the “eastern end of the harbour,” with shipyards along the southeastern side of the port.[35] Merchants, too, found better living conditions in the new part of the city, while the échevins, the royal commissioner and galleys’ officers resided in their specific districts.[36] The Crown designated 100,000 livres to repair the port and rebuild the Arsenal and the Quay; however, Colbert billed the city for some of the project expenses.[37]

The Free Port

While the 1660 structural reforms created some political stability and allowed the Chamber of Commerce to focus exclusively on the management of commerce, there was an immediate need to encourage investment in trading companies and motivate merchants to participate in seaborne trade. The aggrandizement project prepared Marseille for its forthcoming designation as a “free port” in order to accommodate the expected increase in trading traffic. In 1669, a royal Edit declared Marseille a “Free Port” for Levantine trade. The competitive nature of Mediterranean markets, called for innovative ideas such as “Free Ports” to expand trade. During the early modern period, several port cities implemented the concept in varying degrees to attract merchants and expand local commercial industries. The “Free Ports” were designated spaces where states eliminated or reduced taxes, fees, or tariffs to stimulate economic activities.

In 1663, Colbert complained that the inadequate quality of goods exchanged due to lack of proper inspection had made commerce less profitable, and a rather “wasteful” trade was an impediment to France’s economy.[38] The import fees of 20% tax implemented during the early seventeenth which initially benefited the city, in the long run, deterred foreign merchants from exchanging goods through the Vieux Port. Many merchants preferred to trade through Livorno, where they had facilities to store their goods and import without any fees. The decline in textile industry particularly was the primary concern because it consumed a significant part of the imported raw materials from the Levant to manufacture French goods which merchants then sold in the Ottoman territories.[39] In recent years, Marseille had failed to make even a tenth of its usual trade in the Levant. [40] Marseillais merchants argued it was difficult for them to compete with significant import fees. Other obstacles, such as a lack of investment on the part of the Chamber to help the merchants, the absence of quality control and the Crown’s failure to address the issue of pirates and corsairs, all contributed to the overall loss of business.

The Edit of 1669 allowed other cities in France to trade in the Ottoman ports. However, it imposed an ad valorem charge for those goods from the Levant that did not unload by water in Marseille or by land in Rouen or Lyon. This fee, in a way, diverted most traffic from the Mediterranean towards Marseille despite numerous protests by other cities to the Crown. All the goods also had to arrive in French ships in order to receive the 20% discount so long as they stopped in Marseille or Rouen. The Chamber opened offices in other cities to ensure that merchants and patrons paid the 20% surcharge that applied to ships that did not stop in Marseille.[41]

The Edit of 1669 was based on the belief that inviting experienced foreigners was necessary for expanding France’s trade and eliminating some of the main competitors. The demand for Jewish, Armenian, and Greek merchants had already grown since the sixteenth century among western European states who wanted to take advantage of their experience and expertise. They had established networks of trade that extended not only across the Mediterranean but also in the Indian sub-continent and Asia, dealing with numerous goods such as silk, diamonds, coral, and others. Most of them learned to speak several languages, which enabled them to work as intermediaries or even dragomen facilitating diplomatic negotiations. For foreigners who wanted to enjoy the liberties offered by the French Crown, the Edit of 1669 granted settlement privileges, access to French trading opportunities, and a chance to become naturalized citizens. These liberties were conditional based on marriage or property ownership or conducting commerce for twelve consultive years. The ease of migration and commercial policies towards foreigners resulted clusters of foreign communities that mainly consisted of merchants and their families, such as the Jewish and Armenian merchant colonies. The Edict changed the “legal framework” to gaining citizenship as French subjects. The state’s “legal” action to attract foreign merchants was not only a practical resource of commercial growth but also a fundamental aspect of the mercantilist doctrine of the time.[42]

As the next few decades of the seventeenth century would show, the result of urbanization was beneficial to the city in many ways. It created new spaces of settlement and business and investment opportunities, such as real estate in the properties springing out across the new city. The urbanization also prepared Marseille for settlement of merchants who took advantage of the favourable trading privileges. Planners paid particular attention to the quays, port area, and the Chamber building, where merchants gathered to make important decisions. The “old city” remained an integral part of the commercial life of Marseille, where shops, moneychangers, notaries, and other businesses that facilitated mercantile activities existed. The reluctance of the échevinsand deputies to oppose structural changes seemed purely a measure to push back on the Crown for imposing its power over the city’s municipal matters. This resistance was historically common in Marseille. As one historian suggests, despite the monarchy’s intervention, the changes occurred based on the need of the classes who were instrumental in the daily life of the city and had a big hand in the commercial expansion, such as merchants, manufacturers, artisans, and foreign merchants who contributed to the economy of Marseille.[43]

We end this episode by indicating that the urbanization and the restructuring of Marseille’s institutions may have been part of Colbert’s ambitions to carve France’s place in the Mediterranean; but in the long run, the Chamber of Commerce, its administrators, and merchants became powerful players in managing France’s trade in the Mediterranean. The Chamber also became a liaison for Franco-Ottoman trade and diplomatic relationships. By the mid-eighteenth century, Marseille was able to comfortably compete with cities like Venice and Livorno. Raw cotton, silk, olive oil, tobacco, grain, hides, and wool from goats, sheep, and camels came from the Levant and Barbary and were used to manufacture French goods such as textiles and soap. By the 18thcentury, cotton and coffee from the colonies became the main export to the Ottoman Turks.[44] Despite continues efforts of other French cities, Marseille and its stakeholders successfully negotiated and held on to the city’s monopoly over French-Mediterranean trade well into the Revolution.

Thank you for listening; this has been Arazoo Ferozan for the French History Podcast.

[1] John Hajdu Heyer, The Lure and Legacy of Music at Versailles: Louis XIV and the Aix School (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 16.

[2] See Heyer, the Lure and Legacy of Music at Versaille, (chapter on “The winter of 1660: Louis XIV and the royal court visit Provence”)

[3] Heyer, The Lure and Legacy of Music at Versailles, 26.

[4] Thomas Elisson Kirk, 181.

[5] « Edit pour la franchissement du port à Marseille, » 1669, HH 542, AMVM; Masson, Histoire du Commerce Français, 64.

[6] Kettering, French Society, 49-50.

[7] Kettering, French Society, 48-51

[8] Maret, “the Port of Marseilles in the first half of the 16thCentury,”

[9] Kettering, French Society, 48-51

[10] Kettering, French Society, 48-50; Takeda, Between Crown and Commerce, 97.

[11] Maret, 167.

[12] Maret, “the Port of Marseilles in the first half of the 16thCentury”.

[13] “Lettres-Patentes,” 1660, Série A1, Actes et Constitutifs, ACCIM.

[14] Heyer, The Lure and Legacy of Music at Versailles, 21-27.

[15] Fort Saint Jean was built on the site which was originally occupied by the Military Order of the Knights Hospitaller of Saint John, which now included the structure of the commandry that was used as the monastic hospice during the crusades as well as the tower built by King René I.

[16] Heyer, The Lure and Legacy of Music at Versailles, 27.

[17] Fort Saint Jean was built on the site which was originally occupied by the Military Order of the Knights Hospitaller of Saint John, which now included the structure of the commandry that was used as the monastic hospice during the crusades as well as the tower built by King René I.

[18] “Lettres-Patentes, actes II-IV,” 1660, Série A1, Actes et Constitutifs, ACCIM.

[19] Horn, Economic Development in Early Modern France, 136. « Lettres Patentes, actes VI et VIII et X» 1660, Série A1, Actes Constitutifs, ACCM (Appointment of échivens in 1661 according to section X).

[20] « Lettres Patentes, actes VI et VIII et X» 1660, Série A1, Actes Constitutifs, ACCM (Appointment of échivens in 1661 according to section X).

[21] “Lettres-Patentes, actes XXIII, XXIV,” 1660, Série A1, Actes et Constitutifs, ACCIM.

[22] « Correspondance consulaire du Levant et correspondance des députes et comptes de la nation 177 à 1556, » Série J, ACCM.

[23] « Franchise de la ville et du port de Marseille, » 1669, Série D23, ACCIM.

[24] Takeda, Between Crown and Commerce, 25.

[25] Takeda, Between Crown and Commerce, 97.

[26] Sharon Kettering. French Society, 1589-1715 (Edinburgh: Person Education Limited, 2001), 51.

[27] « Lettres Patente, » Juin 1666, AMVM ; Gaston Rambert, Histoire du Commerce de Marseille: de 1660 à 1789, Tome IV (Paris : Plon, 1954), 206. (This topic is also discussed in Rambert’s Nicholas Arnoul, intendant de galéres à Marseille, 204-205); Takeda, Between Crown and Commerce, 21. (Even if Marseille’s merchant elites and municipal stakeholders liked the idea of having a bigger and cleaner city, they were not too eager to follow the plan closely without having a central role in the project. They believed that matters such as the reconstruction of the city was the right and responsibility of the municipality, not the State. Échevinsand négociants claimed that those who were not Marseillais, did not understand their city in particular how commerce functioned).

[28] « Articles et Conditions, article III» 8 Juin 1666, Série DD152, ACCIM; Takeda, Between Crown and Commerce, 25-27.

[29] Takeda, Between Crown and Commerce, 25.

[30] Takeda, Between Crown and Commerce, 25.

[31] « Articles et Conditions : Accorde est François Roustan, Pour faire valoir à Sa Majesté, ce qui proviendra de l’agrandissement de la ville de Marseille, aux conditions que ensuivent, » 8 Juin 1666, Série DD152, ACCIM.

[32] Takeda, Between Crown and Commerce, 27.

[33] Takeda, Between Crown and Commerce, 28

[34] Takeda, Between Crown and Commerce, 25.

[35] Kettering, French Society, 51.

[36]Takeda, Between Crown and Commerce, 30-31 (the échevins agreed to pay 100,000 livres in return for the right to intervene in the construction project.); Béatrice Henin, “l’Agrandissement de Marseille 1666-1690 : Un compromise entre les aspirations monarchiques et les habitudes locales, » Annales du Midi (173), 1998 :12-15.

[37] « Articles et Conditions, article VIII» 8 Juin 1666, Serie DD152, ACCIM; Masson, Histoire du Commerce Français dans le Levant au XVII, 355. Louis XII in 1622 and the wharf by Charles IX in 1566, but needed to be refurbished to both function better and look appealing to the visitors

[38] Colbert, « discours sur les manufactures du royaume », Lettres II, cclvii. (In the next few months, orders were issued, reiterating to both the consuls and ambassadors that their first and foremost responsibility was to listen to merchant grievances and provide solutions so that there was always a smooth flow of trade and profit coming through the commercial ports of France. Furthermore, the early East India and Levant Companies that Richelieu initiated did not have the same outcome as the English and the Dutch. Elite merchants therefore were discouraged to invest any further.

[39] Bergasse, Histoire du Commerce de Marseille, 147-148.

[40] Colbert, « discours sur les manufactures du royaume, » Lettres II, cllvii; Colbert, « mémoire sur le commerce », Lettres II, cclxvi.

[41] « Édit pour le franchissement du port à Marseille, » 1669, Série G5 (Juif à Marseille), ACCIM.

[42] Xambo, « Citoyenneté et commerce. L’affaire Villareal ou la fabrique controversée du mercantilisme marseillais (1669-1682), » ONLINE.

[43] Henin, L'agrandissment de Marseille, 16-17.

[44] Jeff Horn, “Marseille et la question du mercantilisme : privilège, liberté et économie politique en France, 1650-1750,” Histoire, économie & société (30e année).